This course presents, at a medium level, the concepts and tools for the analysis of situations where decision problems of various actors are interdependent, and some actors possess more information than others. Typical issues involve the analysis of actors’ beliefs over time and the strategic use of information. The focus of the course is on a simple but rigorous treatment of the theoretical foundations and equilibrium concepts. Many applications are discussed.
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While not mandatory, it is expected that students in this course have previous knowledge of game theory: namely they should be comfortable with the concepts of Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. This includes solving strategic form games, extensive form games, and mixed strategy equilibria.
Martin J. Osborne (2003), An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press.
Slides and other material will be distributed through Moodle.
The class meets twice a week for 80 min. Classes contain both exposition of the theory and immediate applications. Students will prepare classes with any assigned readings, do two take home problem sets, and answer four online quizzes. Students will be able to discuss course content in Moodle forums.
• Final exam (individual) – 45%
The exam is closed book.
• Problem Sets – 35%
• Moodle-based quizzes – 20%
• In addition, the grade can increase up to 1 point, based on class participation and general commitment of the student towards the course, at the discretion of the instructor.
Strategic form games and Nash equilibrium, extensive form games and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium; Bayesian games and Bayes-Nash equilibrium; Dynamic games, Bayesian-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium; Screening, signalling, mechanism design and auctions; Cooperative game theory.
Programs where the course is taught: