Game Theory


This course presents, at a medium level, the concepts and tools for the analysis of situations where decision problems of various actors are interdependent, and some actors possibly possess more information than others. Typical issues involve predictions of outcomes ("equilibria"), credibility of threats, the analysis of actors' beliefs over time, and the strategic use of information. Many applications are discussed: Competition or collusion in markets, tragedy of the commons, football penalties, chess, threats and credible deterrence, learning and spamming, how to design or participate in auctions, and more. 


General characterization





Responsible teacher

Steffen Heinz Hoernig


Weekly - Available soon

Total - Available soon

Teaching language





Martin J. Osborne (2003), An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press.

Teaching method

In a half-semester course the students will be offered lectures which contain both exposition of the theory and immediate applications. Students will prepare classes with assigned readings, take two group assignments, and answer weekly online quizzes. Students will be able to discuss course content in Moodle forums. 

Evaluation method

Online Quizzes (5%, before day of following class) Two group projects (20% each, pre-assigned groups of 4 students, deadlines November 16th and December 6th) Final exam (55%, minimum grade of 8.0 out of 20) 

Subject matter

1. Dealing with strategic uncertainty: Strategic form games, dominance and the Nash equilibrium 2. When being unpredictable is essential: Randomization and mixed strategies 3. Making and countering threats: Extensive form games, backward induction and subgame-perfectness  4. Cooperation and collusion: repeated interaction and trigger strategies 5. Dealing with uncertainty about opponents: types, learning and hiding of information 6. Designing and participating in auctions: auctions types, bid shading, winner's curse.